

## Message Text

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44

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

----- 065634

R 101755Z JAN 74

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9645

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USNMR SHAPE

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 00484

EXDIS

SHAPE FOR INTAF; VIENNA FOR MBFR DEL

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM, GW

SUBJECT: SALT: STAFFDEL PERLE DISCUSSIONS IN BONN

BEGIN SUMMARY: STAFFDEL PERLE DISCUSSED SALT ISSUES IN BONN DURING SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH FRG DISARMAMENT COMMISSIONER ROTH AND WITH THE DEFMIN ACTING CHIEF FOR MILITARY POLICY AND PLANS, BRIG. GENERAL BRANDT. PERLE CRITIQUE OF SALT-I AGREEMENT, ALONG LINES OF KNOWN POSITION OF SENATOR JACKSON, WON MORE SUPPORT FROM DEFENSE MINISTRY OFFICIALS THAN FROM ROTH. ROTH ALSO COMMENTED ON A NUMBER OF CURRENT SALT AND NUCLEAR ISSUES, INCLUDING RECENT JACKSON PROPOSAL, AND EXPANDED ON 1973 YEAR-END REMARKS REPORTED IN BONN 18298. END SUMMARY

1. PERLE BEGAN CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR ROTH BY RECALLING SENATOR JACKSON'S NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY SECRET

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SPEECH IN BONN, SAYING IT WAS DESIGNED TO JOG EUROPEAN INTEREST IN OVERALL STRATEGIC BALANCE RATHER THAN MERELY SOVIET STRATEGIC SYSTEMS ORIENTED TO EUROPE. ROTH SAID HE GENERALLY AGREED THIS BROADER ATTENTION WAS REQUIRED BUT COMPLAINED THAT EUROPEANS LACKED SUFFICIENT

INFO OR TECHNICAL EXPERTISE FULLY TO APPRAISE IMPLICATIONS OF CENTRAL STRATEGIC BALANCE. FURTHER, "EUROPE" PER SE DOES NOT EXIST IN SECURITY OR DEFENSE AREA. NONETHELESS, WITHIN GERMAN POSSIBILITIES, EARLIER FRG FOCUS ON IRBM/MRBM SYSTEMS HAD SHIFTED TO BROADER STRATEGIC ISSUES. ROTH CONTINUED TO HOPE PETRIGNANI GROUP WOULD AT LEAST PARTIALLY FULFILL THIS FUNCTION, BUT HAD IMPRESSION THAT BRITISH AND FRENCH HAD USEFUL BILATERAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION.

2. ROTH SAID HE DID NOT RPT NOT CONCUR WITH PERLE'S CRITIQUE OF THE SALT-I AGREEMENT, AS HE DID NOT CONSIDER "NUMBERS" TO BE EXCESSIVELY IMPORTANT AND BELIEVED (LAND-BASED) ICBM'S WOULD BECOME OBSOLETE IN DUE COURSE. FOR THIS LATTER REASON, ROTH DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY MIRVING OF THESE ICBM'S WAS SO CRUCIAL. THE OVERRIDING CONSIDERATION IN THE GERMAN VIEW IS CREDIBLE AMERICAN DETERRENT POSTURE, GUARANTEED BY A "SUFFICIENCY" OF U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES TO RETALIATE IN ALL CONCEIVABLE SITUATIONS.

3. IN ROTH'S VIEW, SUBS ARE MUCH MORE IMPORTANT THAN LAND-BASED LAUNCHERS, AND, WHILE HE LACKS SUFFICIENT TECHNOLOGICAL INFO, FLEXIBILITY AFFORDED SOVIETS BY SALT-I ON SLBM'S WAS SOMEWHAT TROUBLING. SACEUR STRIKE AIR FORCES ARE ESSENTIAL, AND FLEXIBILITY AFFORDED BY U.S. BOMBER FORCES IN TERMS OF "SLOW-REACTION POSSIBILITIES" ALSO ARE IMPORTANT; ROTH WAS UNCLEAR ON UNIQUE IMPORTANCE OF NEW B-1 BOMBER. ROTH THOUGHT ABM'S "A WASTE OF MONEY" AT THIS POINT. HE INDICATED THAT RESERVING ABM OPTION HAD COME UP IN GERMAN DISCUSSIONS OF EUROPEAN OPTION ISSUE IN NPT CONTEXT. ON BASIS OF HIS INFORMATION, ROTH BELIEVES THIS WOULD NOT BE JUSTIFIED IN VIEW OF FINANCIAL, POLITICAL/MILITARY OR TECHNOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

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4. TURNING TO PROSPECTS FOR SALT-II, WHICH PERLE ETCHED IN BLEAK SHADES, ROTH SAID "OVEREMPHASIS" OF FBS ISSUE BY EUROPEANS REFLECTED PSYCHOLOGICAL UNEASINESS THAT SALT AGREEMENTS COULD AFFECT NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT IN EUROPE WITHOUT DIRECT INVOLVEMENT OF EUROPEANS. WHILE NON-CIRCUMVENTION APPROACH HAD BEEN ADEQUATE DURING SALT-I AND INITIAL STAGES OF SALT-II, FUTURE STAGES OF SALT WERE UNCLEAR, PARTICULARLY GIVEN U.S./SOVIET ENGAGEMENT IN 1973 SALT DECLARATION TO SEEK 1974 AGREEMENT ON SALT-II. (THIS LATTER POINT WAS MADE IN EVEN

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

----- 065866

R 101808Z JAN 74

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9646

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USNMR SHAPE

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 00484

EXDIS

STRONGER TERMS BY GENERAL BRANDT.) AS TO SOVIETS, ROTH SAID HE REMAINED UNCLEAR CONCERNING RATIONALE AND PRECISE INTEREST OF MOSCOW IN FBS. HE NOTED EMPHASIS IN LATEST SOVIET PROPOSALS ON BASES RATHER THAN WEAPON SYSTEMS, BUT ASSUMED BRITISH BASES AND U.S. SIXTH FLEET OUT OF QUESTION. HE RECOGNIZED SOVIET INTEREST IN FB-11'S IN UK BUT WONDERED ABOUT SOVIET REASONING.

5. PERLE MADE PITCH FOR JACKSON COMMON CEILING TYPE SALT PROPOSAL WITH BOTH ROTH AND BRANDT, STRESSING PROPOSAL WAS SERIOUS AND CONCRETE WAY TO TEST SOVIETS ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. BOTH ROTH AND BRANDT REACTED POSITIVELY TO SPIRIT AND PURPOSE OF JACKSON PROPOSAL. BRANDT AND DEFMIN NATO DEPT CHIEF VON ALTENBURG SAID THEY STRONGLY SHARED SENATOR JACKSON'S CONCERN OVER THE COMBINATION OF SOVIET NUMERICAL ADVANTAGE IN LAND AND SEA BASED LAUNCHERS, MOSCOW'S ACQUISITION OF MIRV AND THE ONWARD MARCH OF RUSSIAN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY. THE DEFMIN OFFICIALS TERMED THESE DEVELOPMENTS "WORRISOME," PARTICULARLY IN TERMS OF DETERRENCE CREDIBILITY.

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6. FINALLY, IN REPLY TO PERLE'S QUESTION, ROTH VOICED OPPOSITION TO "MININUCS" BECAUSE OF HIS JUDGMENT THAT INITIAL CROSSING OF NUCLEAR THRESHOLD WOULD CHANGE MILITARY SCENARIO QUALITATIVELY. MININUCS ALSO INVOLVED CONTROL, CUSTODIAL AND LEASE PROBLEMS, IN VIEW OF NUMBER OF LOCATIONS INVOLVED AND PROBLEM OF PRE-DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO FIELD COMMANDERS. ROTH SAID HE THOUGHT

U.S. THINKING MOVING AWAY FROM SMALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS  
TOWARD PRECISION GUIDED MUNITIONS, A DEVELOPMENT HE  
WOULD FAVOR.

7. COMMENT. LEITMOTIF OF GERMAN REMARKS TO PERLE WAS  
RECOGNITION THAT SALT-II WAS OF POTENTIALLY VITAL  
IMPORTANCE TO FRG SECURITY INTERESTS, BUT FRG OFFICIALS  
FELT THEY LACKED ADEQUATE TECHNICAL INFORMATION  
TO APPRAISE MILITARY/TECHNOLOGICAL RACE. GERMAN QUES-  
TIONS ON SUCH SALT ISSUES CAN BE EXPECTED DURING US/

ANGLO/GERMAN CONSULTATIONS ON MBFR NUCLEAR ASPECTS IN  
WASHINGTON.  
HILLENBRAND

SECRET

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LONDON  
PARIS  
VIENNA  
NATO BRUSSELS  
USNMR SHAPE  
SALT TWO GENEVA

**Type:** TE

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